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and the Ethnic Wage Gap
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Ethnic minorities have lower wages compared to the ethnic majority in most EU-countries. 
However, to what extent these wage gaps are the result of prejudice toward ethnic minority 
workers is virtually unknown. This study sets out to examine what role prejudice play in the 
creation of the ethnic wage gap in one of Europe’s most egalitarian countries, Sweden. The 
analysis takes into account the important distinction between average employer attitudes and 
the attitude of the marginal employer. Our results confirm that the attitudes of the marginal 
employer – but not those of the average employer – are important for the ethnic wage gap. 
This relationship becomes even stronger when potential measurement error and other forms 
of endogeneity are accounted for by controlling for a rich set of variables and implementing 
instrumental variable techniques. 
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The Amsterdam Treaty has prohibited ethnic discrimination in employment and 
occupational matters in all EU countries. Still, it is well established that in most EU-
countries ethnic minorities have lower wages compared to the ethnic majority (e.g., 
Adsera & Chiswick, 2007, and OECD, 2007).
1 Moreover, prejudice against the ethnic 
minority in Europe seems to be severe judging from attitudes surveys and correspondence 
studies (e.g., Riach and Rich, 2002, Carlsson and Rooth, 2007). 
However, to what extent these wage gaps are in fact created by prejudice toward 
ethnic minority workers is uncertain at best. An ethnic difference in unobserved supply 
side characteristics could be responsible for these wage gaps as well. In Figure 1 the 
ethnic/immigrant wage gap for fifteen EU-countries together with the share of individuals 
with negative attitudes toward the ethnic minority among the public is plotted.
2 If 
                                                 
1 See Algan et al. (2010) for a comparative analysis of ethnic differences in labor market outcomes in 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
2 The ethnic minority/immigrant wage gaps are taken from Table A3 in Adsera and Chiswick (2007), and 
controls for years of schooling and age. The share with negative attitudes among the public is calculated 
from the European Social Survey (ESS), which is a social survey designed to, among other things, map 
attitudes in Europe (see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The ESS has been conducted the following 
years: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. By merging these five waves we obtained a sample consisting of 
122,670 respondents for the fifteen EU countries where wages also are observed. The prejudice measure 
plotted in Figure 1 was constructed from the following question: “To what extent do you think [country] 
should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here?” The answering 
alternatives are 1 “Allow many to come and live here”, 2 “Allow some”,  3 “Allow a few”, and 4 “Allow 
none”. For each respondent there is also information about in which country he or she lived at the time of 
  1prejudice is important for explaining the variation in the ethnic wage gap within the EU, 
prejudice and the ethnic wage gap are expected to be negatively correlated at the country 
level. However, Figure 1 lends little support for a negative correlation between prejudice 
and ethnic wage gaps. 
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
Nevertheless, it might be premature to reject employer prejudice as an important 
factor that determines the ethnic wage gap in Europe. In a recent paper, Charles and 
Guryan (2008) propose a new methodology for analyzing the effect of employer 
prejudice on the ethnic wage gap. They emphasize the importance of taking into 
consideration one of Becker’s (1957) insights, namely, the distinction between average 
employer attitudes and the attitude of the marginal employer; it is the attitude of the 
marginal employer that determines the relative market wage for minority workers. This 
distinction emerges if minority workers sort away from the most prejudiced employers in 
the labor market. When sorting occurs, the market wage for minority workers will be 
determined by the most prejudiced employer that hires minority workers and not by 
average employer attitudes, which is what we use in Figure 1. 
The main contribution of the current paper is to analyze to what extent negative 
attitudes toward the ethnic minority are an important factor that determines the ethnic 
wage gap in an European context when specifically taking the attitude of the marginal 
                                                                                                                                                 
the survey. Based on this information the prejudice measure was constructed at the country level by 
calculating the share that responded either alternative 3 or 4.  
  2employer into account. Unfortunately, the aggregated European data presented in Figure 
1 do not have enough variation in the prejudice of the marginal employer to allow for an 
implementation of the Charles and Guryan design. Instead we follow an alternative route 
by analyzing the prejudice-ethnic wage gap link for Sweden. In Figure 1 Sweden is 
located furthest to the left, that is, Sweden is the least prejudiced country among these 
fifteen EU-countries. Sweden is in this respect a benchmark case – if employer attitudes 
toward ethnic minorities have consequences for the ethnic wage gap in one of the most 
egalitarian countries in Europe, prejudice is also expected to matter in less egalitarian 
countries. 
The data available for Sweden not only allow for calculating the ethnic wage gap and 
the share of employers with negative attitudes at the regional level. They also allow for 
constructing a measure of the attitude of the marginal employer at the regional level by 
combining the regional distribution of attitudes with the share of minority workers in a 
region. Our strategy for testing the prejudice-ethnic wage gap link is to use regional 
variation in the ethnic wage gap, average attitudes, and the attitude of the marginal 
employer. 
In addition to analyzing the role of marginal prejudice for the ethnic wage gap in a 
European context we extend Charles and Guryan´s (2008) analysis in two ways. Firstly, 
we address whether it makes a difference to the results if we take the employment of 
ethnic minority workers by ethnic minority employers into account. Secondly, we make 
an attempt to correct for any endogeneity of the prejudice measure by proposing two 
different instrumental variable strategies. Another strength of the current study is the 
  3relatively large number of units (290) at the level where the ethnic wage gap and the 
attitudes are measured.  
The results confirm that the attitudes of the marginal employer – but not those of the 
average employer – are important for the ethnic wage gap. This distinction is precisely 
what to expect if minority workers sort away from the most prejudiced employers in the 
labor market. This result becomes even stronger when we take into account potential 
measurement error and other forms of endogeneity using a rich set of control variables as 
well as instrumental variable techniques. In summary, our findings indicate that employer 
prejudice is important for the ethnic wage gap even in an egalitarian country such as 
Sweden.  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Becker 
model and reviews some previous studies in this area, while Section 3 presents the data 
on attitudes and wages and how we construct the prejudice measures. Section 4 examines 
the association between prejudice and the ethnic wage gap, while Section 5 runs a 
number of sensitivity analyses of this relationship. Section 6 discusses the results. 
 
2. Previous studies 
Charles and Guryan (2008) test and confirm the predictions from Becker’s (1957) 
seminal work on White-Black wage differentials and employer prejudice by utilizing 
regional variation in population attitudes. Their focus is especially on the attitude of the 
marginal employer and not on the average attitude of the employers in a region. This is 
motivated by the fact that in Becker's original model Blacks are assumed to sort away 
from the most prejudiced employers, which implies that the relative wage for Black 
  4workers will be determined by the attitude of the marginal employer. To get an intuition 
of how this works, assume initially that the supply of Black workers is relatively small 
(S1 in Figure 2). In this situation there are enough non-prejudiced employers to hire all 
Black workers – the marginal employer is not prejudiced – so Blacks and Whites will 
have equal wages. 
 
    ***  Figure  2  about  here  *** 
 
Now, instead imagine a situation where there is a relative large supply of Black 
workers (S2 in Figure 2). In this case there will not be enough non-prejudiced employers 
to hire all Black workers – the marginal employer is prejudiced. Thus, for the market to 
clear in this case the wages for Black workers have to be lower than for White workers. 
These two situations illustrate that when Black workers sort to the least prejudiced 
employers it is the prejudice/attitude of the marginal employer that determines the 
relative wage for Blacks, while the share of employers with negative attitudes not 
necessarily is associated with the relative wage.  
A further implication of Becker’s model concerns how changes in prejudice among 
employers affect the relative wage for Black workers. Suppose that a shift of the relative 
demand curve occurs from D to D´ such that prejudice increases among those likely to be 
the marginal employer. Then the relative wage for Black workers is expected to decrease. 
However, the relative wage will not be affected by a change in the prejudice of the 
average employer if the attitude of the marginal employer remains the same. 
  5Charles and Guryan (2008) relate wage differentials between White and Black 
workers to employer prejudice at the state level in the U.S. One of their main results is 
that the attitude of the marginal employer significantly and negatively influences the 
White-Black wage gap, while they do not find such an effect for the average level of 
attitudes among employers. 
Another related study is Waisman & Larsen (2008) who studies if the share of 
employers with negative attitudes affects the refugee immigrant earnings gap in Sweden. 
They attempt to control for unobserved regional ethnic skill differences by utilizing a 
Swedish refugee settlement policy, which basically implies random placement of 
refugees in regions. They find that having relatively more negative attitudes in a region 
increases the ethnic wage differential and also influences future mobility decisions of 
refugee immigrants away from more prejudiced regions. 
Åslund & Rooth (2005) utilize the change in attitudes toward ethnic minorities 
following the terror attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, as a natural experiment 
to measure if a negative attitude has an affect on the labor market opportunities of 
minorities. They use this event as an exogenous shock to average attitudes and find that 
the relative probability of employment for minorities did in fact not decrease after 9/11. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that the attitudes of the marginal employer 
might have been unaffected by 9/11. 
Rooth (2010) also studies the relationship between attitudes and discriminatory 
behavior, but at the firm level. In his study, recruiters from a sample of firms were 
involved in two experiments: a field experiment on discrimination in hiring and an 
experiment that measures their implicit attitudes as an IAT-score. This study finds that 
  6recruiters with higher IAT-scores – which imply more negative implicit attitudes toward 
people from the Middle East – are less likely to invite applicants with a typical Middle 
Eastern name to a job interview compared to applicants with a typical Swedish name. 
Hence, this study finds evidence for an existing link between employer attitudes and 
discrimination in hiring at a randomly selected employer. 
Finally, Pager and Quillian (2005) examine the relationship between employers’ 
attitudes towards hiring Black and White ex-offenders and their actual hiring behavior. 
They find a large race difference in the likelihood of being hired, but there was no 
indication of a corresponding difference in employers' reported attitudes towards Black 
and White ex-offenders.  
 
3. Data 
The aim of this section is to present the construction of the different prejudice measures 
that will be used in the empirical analysis: the share with negative attitudes towards the 
ethnic minority, marginal prejudice and extreme prejudice. We also explain how the 
ethnic earnings gap is calculated and what data are used to this end.  
 
3.1 The prejudice measures 
To construct the measures of employer prejudice we use data obtained from FSI (2004), a 
Swedish research institute that, among other things, measures attitudes of the Swedish 
population on various dimensions. Of course it would have been an advantage if we had 
survey data specifically aimed at measuring employer attitudes and not only the attitudes 
of the general public. Since such data are not available we make the assumption that it is 
  7the same mechanisms that determine employer attitudes and the attitudes of the general 
public in a region.
3  
The FSI attitude survey has been conducted each year since the 1980s on a random 
sample of individuals in the Swedish population. By merging the years 2000 to 2008, a 
sample consisting of 19,555 respondents was obtained. The prejudice measures were then 
constructed from the following question (own translation from Swedish): “What do you 
think of the immigrants that we have received as a contribution to the Swedish 
population?”. The possible answers are: 1) “Very valuable” (14 %), 2) “Quite valuable” 
(44 %), 3) “Not very valuable” (31 %), and 4) “Not valuable at all” (11 %).
4 For each 
respondent there is also information about in which municipality he or she lived at the 
time of the survey. Based on this information the prejudice measures were constructed at 
the municipality level. 
                                                 
3 In Carlsson and Rooth (2011) we relate the share with negative attitudes towards the ethnic minority to 
the ethnic difference in callback rates for a job interview within a field experiment. When dividing the 
municipalities into "good" and "bad" ones depending on if the share having negative attitudes in a region 
was below or above the sample average we find that the ethnic gap in callbacks for a job interview is 
greater in "bad" compared to "good" regions. In other words, whether a municipality is classified as “bad” 
or “good” can to some extent predict the ethnic difference in callbacks for a job interview. This suggests 
that there in fact is a link between public prejudice, employer prejudice and discriminatory behavior when 
hiring.  
4 The question also includes an additional alternative, “Unsure, do not know”, which was excluded in the 
construction of the prejudice measure, since this alternative is difficult to interpret. 3,011 respondents out 
of 19,555 answered this alternative. The survey also contained other questions about immigrants and 
immigration to Sweden. However, these questions were more about immigration legislation, while the 
chosen question is more related to the immigrant group itself. 
  8The first measure is defined as the share in a municipality that has negative attitudes 
towards the ethnic minority, that is, responded either 3 – “Not very valuable” – or 4 – 
“Not valuable at all”. Figure 3 shows the distribution of this measure for the 290 
municipalities in Sweden. Judging from the figure, this attitude measure is distributed 
across the prejudice scale, from very low degrees of prejudice to very high. Moreover, 
Figure 4 shows that very prejudiced regions are not particularly geographically 
concentrated, but rather distributed throughout the country.  
 
*** Figure 3 and 4 about here *** 
 
The second measure – the prejudice of the marginal employer in a municipality – is 
constructed by combining the distribution of answers to the attitude question with the 
share p of the workforce with an ethnic minority background.
5 More specifically, the 
prejudice of the marginal employer is defined as percentile p in the answer distribution of 
the FSI attitude question, where the possible answers go from 1 to 4. It turns out that in 
all instances the percentile p corresponds either to answer 1 or 2, thus indicating that the 
marginal employer is not very prejudiced. This is precisely what the Becker model would 
predict if the supply of ethnic minority labor is relatively low – as in our case – and 
                                                 
5 The share of the workforce in a region that belongs to the ethnic minority is calculated using the male 
population being 25-40 years old, which is expected to have a strong attachment to the labor force. To the 
extent that the ethnic minority has a weaker labor force participation rate than the majority this 
approximation will introduce measurement error in the variable that measures the prejudice of marginal 
employer. Measurement error will in this case lead to a downward bias and we underestimate the 
relationship between the ethnic wage gap and the prejudice of the marginal employer.      
  9ethnic minority workers are able to sort themselves to the least prejudiced employers. 
Since the attitude of the marginal employer only takes two values, this measure is 
transformed into a dummy variable that equals zero if the attitude of the marginal 
employer is alternative 1 and one if the attitude of the marginal employer is alternative 2, 
that is, in the latter case, the marginal employer is more prejudiced. 
One could suspect that these prejudice measures – the share with negative attitudes 
and marginal prejudice – are strongly correlated, but in fact, it turns out that their 
correlation is quite low (r=0.23). This can also be seen in Figure 4 in that there are clear 
differences in the geographical distribution of the share with negative attitudes and 
marginal prejudice. Such distributional differences exist also within LMAs; see for 
example the three large LMAs of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmoe in Figure 4 
(regions within the circles). One could also be worried that marginal prejudice is strongly 
correlated with the ethnic minority share in a municipality. However, also that correlation 
is quite low (r=0.39) despite the fact that marginal prejudice partly is composed of the 
ethnic minority share in the region. In an attempt to purge the marginal prejudice measure 
of the ethnic minority share, we always control for the ethnic minority share in the 
empirical analysis.  
Our final measure of prejudice relates to extreme (negative) attitudes. Such attitudes 
are not expected to matter if the Becker prejudice model describes the world well, since 
sorting of minority workers to the least prejudiced employers makes it unlikely that 
minority workers ever will encounter employers with extreme attitudes. The extreme 
  10attitude in a municipality is defined by the answer to the attitude question (1-4) at the 
90th percentile of the prejudice distribution.
6 
  
3.2 Annual income from work and the ethnic wage gap 
The income data consist of annual income from work for the Swedish population in 2003, 
taken from the tax registers at Statistics Sweden. We restrict the analysis of the ethnic 
wage gap to study only males aged 35-45 (more than 500,000 individuals), since 
individuals in this age range are likely to have stable income from work. The analysis is 
further restricted to study only individuals that belong to the ethnic majority, i.e., native 
Swedes, or to those who have a non-Nordic foreign background, which constitute the 
group that we define as the ethnic minority. Some additional restrictions are put on who 
belongs to the ethnic minority by only including persons who either immigrated to 
Sweden from a non-Nordic country more than fifteen years ago (13,000 individuals) or 
were born in Sweden but has at least one parent born outside Scandinavia (24,000 
individuals). The use of these restrictions is an attempt to not confuse ethnic wage gaps 
with immigrant wage gaps, with the latter being more difficult to interpret and explain. 
A potential issue is that our "wage" measure is based on annual income instead of 
hourly wages. However, it can be argued that the variation in annual income from work 
above a certain threshold closely mimics the variation in hourly wages. The argument is 
based on the fact that individuals with higher annual income are more likely to have 
                                                 
6 In principle, the answer at the 90th percentile could be any alternative, including the most positive 
alternatives, which would be the case in a municipality where almost all residents are positive to 
immigrants. However, in our sample, the answer at the 90th percentile is always either alternative 3 or 4. 
This motivates labeling the answer at the 90th percentile as an extreme attitude. 
  11similar amounts of time worked (hours and weeks). For example, Antelius and Björklund 
(2000) show, in a Swedish context, that if a threshold of 100,000 SEK (approximately 
10,000 euro) is used when analyzing annual income from work based on tax records, one 
receives a return to education similar to the one obtained from analyzing hourly wages. 
Also in our case we expect an estimate of the ethnic income gap that is based on annual 
income from work above a 100,000 SEK threshold to be close to an estimate of the ethnic 
wage gap based on hourly wages. Hence, this motivates only including individuals using 
annual income from work above 100,000 SEK in the main analysis.
7 
Before turning to the empirical analysis we note that the ethnic income gap in our 
subsample is approximately -5 percent when we control only for municipality fixed 
effects.
8 Figure 4 shows that the size of this wage gap varies to a large extent across the 
municipalities and there is a quite large variation also within larger labor market areas 
such as Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmoe. Finally, Table A1 in the appendix gives the 
descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section the different prejudice measures will be related to the ethnic wage gap at 
the municipality level. In all regressions log annual income from work (above 100,000 
                                                 
7 In Section 5 we also estimate the main models without this threshold, that is, using all individuals with a 
positive income. Including also individuals with an annual income below 100,000 SEK, did, if anything, 
strengthen our main findings. 
8 The average ethnic wage gap is -0.04 and its standard deviation 0.25 when assigning equal weight to each 
municipality. 
  12SEK) will be the dependent variable, while the explanatory variables of most interest are 
the various prejudice measures along with their interaction with the ethnic minority 
indicator. To start with, the ethnic wage gap will be related to the share of employers with 
negative attitudes in a municipality. However, as explained earlier and motivated by 
Becker’s theory, if minority workers sort away from the most prejudiced employers a 
more relevant prejudice measure for the relative wage of minority workers should be the 
prejudice of the marginal employer. Finally, we also test whether extreme attitudes are 
related to the ethnic wage gap.  
In this first set of results we control for a number of important characteristics that are 
expected to be correlated with the ethnic wage gap and the prejudice variables: the share 
of the ethnic minority in a region, years of schooling, age and age squared. The share of 
minority workers is mainly included as a control variable in an attempt to address the fact 
that the attitude of the marginal employer might – by construction of the variable – 
capture something related to this variable. For example, if ethnic minority workers with 
the best unobserved skills selectively sort out from municipalities with a larger share of 
the minority, we will find a positive correlation between the ethnic wage gap and the 
share of the ethnic minority. But at the same time prejudice might also be more severe in 
municipalities with a larger share of the ethnic minority. Without a control for the share 
of the minority the marginal prejudice variable might capture such a spurious correlation, 
which would result in an inconsistent estimate (with an upward bias in this example). 
  13Adding the "Mincer" human capital components to the model is an attempt to address 
other similar endogeneity problems.
9 
In the first column of Table 1, which shows the output from regressing annual 
income from work on the ethnic minority indicator variable (Minority) and municipality 
fixed effects, the ethnic wage gap is found to be approximately five percent. When 
controls for the share of the ethnic minority in the region, years of schooling, age and age 
squared are added to the model the ethnic wage gap decreases slightly to four percent 
(see column 2). This is the ethnic wage gap to be explained by our prejudice variables. 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
In the third column the share of employers with negative attitudes and its interaction 
with the ethnic minority indicator are added to the model in column 2. The point estimate 
of the share with negative attitudes shows that workers in regions in which a larger share 
of the employers are prejudiced receive lower wages, but this correlation is not stronger 
for the ethnic minority; the interaction effect of the ethnic minority and the share of 
employers is not statistically significant.  
In the fourth column the prejudice of the marginal employer and its interaction term 
with the ethnic minority indicator is added to the model in column 2. As predicted by the 
Becker model, the wages of native Swedes are not affected by the prejudice of the 
marginal employer, but the wages of the ethnic minority are. The interpretation of the 
                                                 
9 Our estimates for marginal prejudice are unaffected when age and years of schooling are treated as fixed 
effects. 
  14point estimate is that ethnic minority workers have on average five percent lower wages 
compared to majority workers in municipalities where the marginal employer answered 
"Quite valuable“ as opposed to "Very valuable". This association is also estimated with 
great precision.  
As for the other prejudice measures the extreme prejudice measure and its interaction 
with the ethnic minority indicator are also added to the model in column 2, see column 5. 
These results are similar to those pertaining to the share with negative attitudes. Extreme 
prejudice is important in that native Swedes living in regions with relatively more 
extreme attitudes have lower wages, but there is no additional wage penalty for the ethnic 
minority. Finally, in column 6 we add all three prejudice measures and their interaction 
with the ethnic minority indicator to the model in column 2. The results are virtually 
unchanged if these variables are entered one by one and the only prejudice measure that 
is associated with the ethnic wage gap is the prejudice of the marginal employer.  
In an attempt to mimic the ethnic wage gap – despite using annual earnings – we 
include only individuals earning more than 100,000 SEK. As an alternative we replicate 
the regressions in Table 1 but this time we include everyone earning a positive amount. 
Also for this data only the prejudice of the marginal employer is significantly related to 
the ethnic wage gap, see Table A3 in the appendix. Since the estimate of marginal 
prejudice in this specification is more than twice as high compared to in Table 1 it 
indicates that prejudice also is important for part-time employees.
10  
The findings presented in this section mirror those from the Charles and Guryan 
(2008) study by showing that it is the attitudes of the marginal employer that have the 
                                                 
10 See Nordin and Rooth (2011) for the ethnic earnings gap when using different cut offs for earnings. 
  15greatest explanatory power for the ethnic wage gap. This is what the Becker prejudice 
model would predict. In what follows we will address to what extent this is just a 
spurious finding.          
 
5. Sensitivity analysis - is marginal prejudice just a spurious finding? 
Next we focus more closely on the results for marginal prejudice and attempt to address 
several possible alternative explanations for the result, i.e., that the marginal prejudice 
variable is endogenous. In our context endogeneity can arise from a number of sources 
such as omitted variables – at either the municipality or worker level, from selective 
sorting of workers across municipalities, and measurement error in the marginal prejudice 
variable.
11 In an attempt to address some of these issues we first use a control variable 
strategy. Next we implement a correction procedure of the marginal prejudice measure 
followed by an instrumental variable strategy. In what follows we also include the share 
of employers with negative attitudes.
12 
 
5.1 Control variable strategy 
This section attempts to address the endogeneity problems in terms of omitted variables 
at the municipality and worker level by investigating the sensitivity of our findings for 
the prejudice variables in Table 1 when adding more and more variables that potentially 
                                                 
11 Endogeneity due to measurement error in the prejudice measure would lead to an underestimation of the 
effect that prejudice has on the ethnic wage gap, while the direction of the bias for remaining sources of 
endogeneity is less clear. 
12 The results for marginal prejudice are insensitive to whether this variable is included, and also to whether 
we include extreme attitudes or not. 
  16are important for misinterpreting the link between marginal prejudice and the ethnic wage 
gap. A preview of the results presented in Table 2 shows that the only prejudice variable 
affecting the ethnic wage gap is the prejudice of the marginal employer and, hence, we 
discuss only the interaction effect with this variable and the ethnic minority dummy in 
what follows. In contrast to this finding, the share of employers with negative attitudes 
does not appear to be important for the ethnic wage gap for which it is always statistically 
insignificant. However, this variable is almost always correlated with majority wages for 
which it is statistically significant and negative. 
In order to address the sensitivity of the estimate of marginal prejudice for the ethnic 
wage gap when different types of controls are added we start with a somewhat simpler 
model than what ended Table 1. In the first column of Table 2 only age and age squared 
are controlled for. When controlling for these variables, the estimate of the marginal 
prejudice times the ethnic minority indicator interaction becomes even larger, it increases 
from minus four to minus seven percent, indicating that the estimate in column 6 in Table 
1 is affected by omitted variables. Somewhat surprisingly the estimate increases to -0.08 
when the share of the ethnic minority in a region is controlled for, see column 2.  In the 
next column years of schooling is added and the estimate of marginal prejudice then 
drops to -0.05, indicating that the measure of the marginal prejudice partly captures 
ethnic skill gaps. To further investigate this issue we use information about ethnic 
cognitive skill gaps measured on a municipality level.
13 However, the fourth column 
                                                 
13 This measure is calculated from the test score on a cognitive test when enlisting for the military, which is 
mandatory for all Swedish citizens the year they turn 18. It gives the ethnic cognitive skill gap per 
municipality using the same definition of the ethnic minority as in this paper.  
  17shows that adding this measure of ethnic cognitive skill gaps, if anything, increases the 
marginal prejudice estimate. 
  
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
A related issue is whether our measure of marginal prejudice is correlated with local 
labor market characteristics such as the local unemployment rate. This is perhaps the 
most obvious variable that might lead to inconsistent estimates if omitted. It does not 
seem completely unrealistic to assume that prejudice towards the ethnic minority to some 
extent is driven by the regional level of unemployment. The existence of such a link is 
problematic for the analysis if the level of unemployment also determines the ethic wage 
gap, which may well be the case since minority workers on average are less attached to 
the labor market and as a consequence might have less opportunity to obtain a higher 
wage. The estimate of marginal prejudice is minus six percent when controlling for the 
share of unemployed in the municipality in the regressions, see column 5.  
In column 6 a number of controls measuring the characteristics of the immigrant 
population at the municipality level are added: the share of immigrants from outside the 
EU, the share of refugees among the immigrants, and the share on income support among 
the foreign born (labeled Characteristics of the minority population in the tables). The 
goal here is to control for average ethnic differences in unobserved skills that might be 
correlated with the attitude measure at the municipality level. Such average ethnic 
differences may arise if minority workers sort across municipalities. These control 
  18variables are added to the specification in column 5 without affecting the estimate of 
marginal prejudice, or its precision, at all. 
In column 7 we simultaneously add all the characteristics mentioned above. Despite 
these extensive controls the impact of the prejudice of the marginal employer on the 
ethnic wage gap is economically and statistically significant (-0.03). 
As in the previous section we re-estimate the models in Table 2 including all 
individuals earning a positive income. The estimate for marginal prejudice in Table A3 is 
reduced in a similar way as in Table 2 when the different control variables are added, but 
its magnitude is much larger than in Table 2.   
A remaining issue is related to the fact that the marginal prejudice variable is partly 
constructed from the variable measuring the share of ethnic minority individuals in a 
municipality. One might be concerned that marginal prejudice captures something related 
to the share of ethnic minority individuals in the municipality in a non-linear way. In an 
attempt to address this potential issue we have estimated the main regressions including 
different degrees of polynomials of the share of minority workers without any change in 
results. 
In conclusion, when re-estimating the model with a number of important control 
variables added in a stepwise fashion, as well as simultaneously, the coefficient of the 
prejudice of the marginal employer remains negative and strongly significant. 
 
5.2 Ethnic minority employers  
The way we construct the marginal prejudice variable, that is, it being based on 
population attitudes as opposed to only native Swedes´ attitudes, implies that we 
  19implicitly assume that the ethnic minority acts as employers to the same extent as their 
population share. If ethnic minority employers have the most positive attitudes these 
individuals will be located to the leftmost in the prejudice distribution and ethnic 
minority workers would first sort to ethnic minority employers, and to non-prejudiced 
majority employers, before sorting into evermore prejudiced majority employers. 
However, if the ethnic minority does not act as employers to the same extent as their 
population share we will in this case have measurement error in the marginal prejudice 
variable. An extreme alternative would instead be to assume that no employers belong to 
the ethnic minority, that is, a more accurate measure of marginal prejudice would be 
obtained by removing the leftmost part of the prejudice distribution based on the full 
population.
14 Since we do not have access to information on the share of ethnic minority 
employers in a region we just simply exclude p percent of the leftmost side of the 
population attitude distribution and thereafter construct the marginal prejudice measure in 
the same way as before. Column 8 in Table 2 shows that the estimate of marginal 
prejudice basically is unaffected by this procedure.
15 
 
5.3 Instrumenting the marginal prejudice measure 
Although we have added control variables in an attempt to solve the potential problems 
with omitted variables at the municipality and worker level, it is still possible that we 
have overlooked important control variables. Moreover, so far we have not addressed the 
issue of measurement error in the attitude variables. The number of respondents to the 
                                                 
14 We owe to Kate Antonovics for pointing this out. 
15 The correlation between the two marginal prejudice measures is 0.53. 
  20attitude survey that constitute the base for calculating the prejudice measures is very low 
in some municipalities, hence, potentially giving rise to measurement error. In this 
section we implement instrumental variable techniques to further address the problem 
with omitted variables and also measurement error.  
 
From municipality to LMAs – nonrandom sorting across geographic units 
The potential problem with omitted variables at the worker level is likely to be related to 
nonrandom sorting of minority workers across municipality borders that affects the 
regional unobserved ethnic skill gap.
16 Perhaps the most obvious variable that minority 
workers might respond to by sorting is employer prejudice itself.  
Variation in marginal prejudice comes from two sources: regional differences in the 
share of the ethnic minority and in the prejudice distribution. The share of the ethnic 
minority in a municipality is directly controlled for in the main regressions, but the 
marginal prejudice variable can still be endogenous if the prejudice distribution is. The 
main concern is that minority workers sort across municipality borders in response to the 
level of prejudice in such a way that the regional unobserved ethnic skill gap is affected. 
For example, minority workers with worse unobserved skills might be relatively more 
responsive to regional prejudice differences and will therefore have a higher probability 
to relocate to less prejudiced regions. In that case marginal prejudice might only impact 
the regional ethnic wage gap indirectly through its effect on the unobserved ethnic skill 
                                                 
16 The prejudice measures can certainly be endogenous due to omitted variables at the municipality level as 
well. Beyond the control variables that are included in the analysis at the municipality level, we cannot 
come up with any instruments that would generate exogenous variation in the prejudice measures. 
  21gap and, hence, we are likely to obtain inconsistent estimates (with a downward bias) of 
how marginal prejudice affects the ethnic wage gap. In a similar way sorting across 
municipality borders might result in inconsistent estimates of how the share of prejudiced 
employers in a municipality affects the ethnic wage gap. 
In an attempt to address issues related to sorting across municipality borders, we take 
advantage of the fact that the choice of which region to work in is likely to be limited by 
factors such as an individual’s wish to remain nearby family and friends. This implies 
that the unobserved ethnic skill gap in sufficiently large geographical regions should be 
unaffected by sorting across smaller areas. Thus, in the analysis we utilize that an 
analysis based on a larger area is likely to be more robust to sorting by implementing an 
instrumental variable technique, where attitudes measured at the smaller municipality 
level is instrumented by attitudes measured at the larger labor market area level.
17 This 
strategy will result in consistent estimates of the different prejudice measures if the 
chosen work location always is inside the larger labor market area. 
Column 1 in Table 3 basically replicates column 7 from Table 2, but does not include 
the share with negative attitudes – the focus is here exclusively on the marginal prejudice 
measure. In the next column we include the reduced form, i.e., using a marginal prejudice 
measure based on larger geographical units (labor market areas). Irrespective of being 
measured on a municipality or LMA level the estimates for marginal prejudiced are very 
                                                 
17 The idea to use averages for larger spatial areas as instruments for smaller areas is not a new one. For 
example, Dustmann and Preston (2001) use a similar implementation in a partly methodological paper that 
studies how negative attitudes toward the ethnic minority are affected by the ethnic composition in the 
region. 
  22similar.
18 In the third column we instrument marginal prejudice defined on the 
municipality level with marginal prejudice defined on the LMA level. The estimate 
increases quite substantially to -0.07, suggesting that there is sorting of workers across 
municipalities, which leads to a quite substantial downward bias when not taking 
endogenous sorting into account.
19 In the fourth to sixth column the analysis for the first 
three columns is repeated but now including, and instrumenting, also the share with 
negative attitudes. The estimates for the interaction effect of the share with negative 
attitudes remains statistically imprecise and basically zero in the final IV specification, 
see column 6. Also, the results for marginal prejudice are virtually unchanged when the 
share with negative attitudes is included in the regressions. 
In conclusion, this exercise suggests that marginal prejudice is even more important 
for the ethnic wage gap than what was found in the main analysis. 
 
Attitudes reflected in general elections – correcting for measurement error 
Due to very few respondents in some municipalities, the constructed attitude measures 
are likely to be plagued by measurement error, which would lead to inconsistent and 
downwards biased estimates of how attitudes affect the ethnic wage gap. In this section 
we try to correct for measurement error in the attitude variables by using instrumental 
variable techniques. The idea is to find an alternative attitude measure that can be used as 
                                                 
18 The sample correlation between marginal attitudes at the municipality and labor market area level is 
approximately 0.51. Also, this similarity in estimates when using larger geographic areas indicates that 
measurement error is less of an issue. However, below, when using another measure of prejudice and an 
instrumental variable strategy, we find measurement error to create an important downward bias.    
19 The t-value of the first stage regression is around 219. 
  23an instrument for the FSI attitude measure. In effect, such an instrumental variable 
strategy will use only the variation in the FSI attitude measure that is also present in the 
alternative attitude measure. To the extent that the measurement errors in the two attitude 
measures are uncorrelated, this approach will purge the estimates from the downward 
bias caused by measurement error. 
Our alternative attitude measure is the number of votes casted – at the municipality 
level – on the populist anti-immigration party The Sweden Democrats (SD) in the 2010 
general election in Sweden. When assigning equal weights to the 290 municipalities we 
find that SD received on average around 6.3 percent of the total number of votes with a 
standard deviation of approximately 2.5.
20 As an instrument for the regional share of 
employers with negative attitudes we simply use the share of the population that voted for 
SD in each municipality.  
How to construct the instrument for marginal prejudice might, however, be less 
obvious. If we consider the share v that voted for SD in a particular municipality, this 
number represents a rough distribution of all the votes in a municipality with only two 
mass points:  (1-v) is the percentage that did not vote for SD and v is the percentage that 
did vote for SD. To the extent that voting for SD reflects attitudes, (1-v) defines the share 
with positive attitudes and v the share with negative attitudes in a municipality. Accepting 
this as a prejudice distribution should make it possible to calculate regional marginal 
prejudice the same way as before by pinpointing the attitude at percentile p in this simple 
prejudice distribution (where p as before is the share of the minority in a municipality).  
                                                 
20 When the results at the municipality level is weighted by the number of votes in each municipality the 
average is instead roughly around 5.7 percent, which is the official election result in 2010. 
  24However, it turns out that when marginal prejudice is defined in this way it always 
takes the most positive alternative.
21 Hence, the problem with this approach appears to be 
that the share that voted for SD is a very rough measure of attitudes.  
An alternative way to extract at least part of the information common to both 
prejudice measures is to standardize the share that voted for SD as well as the share of the 
minority and then simply compare the two standardized variables for each municipality. 
We construct this alternative marginal prejudice indicator by assigning a zero to the 
indicator when the standardized share of the minority is less than the standardized share 
that did not vote for SD (153 municipalities) and setting it to one otherwise (137 
municipalities). With this construction marginal prejudice should on average be lower in 
municipalities where the indicator equals zero as opposed to one. Although being a rough 
measure of marginal prejudice it is a valid instrument for the FSI marginal prejudice 
measure if the two measures have measurement errors that are uncorrelated, which we 
find quite likely since the attitude measures is constructed from primary data that were 
collected independently using very different methods. 
  The first column of Table 4 replicates the first column of Table 3, producing an 
estimate of -0.03 for marginal prejudice. In the next column we include the reduced form, 
i.e. using the alternative marginal prejudice measure based on the share that voted for SD. 
Even if the two marginal prejudice measures only have a correlation of r=0.09 their 
estimates are identical. In the third column we instrument marginal prejudice defined by 
                                                 
21 The obvious explanation is that the clear majority of citizens did not vote for SD and the share of the 
minority is relatively low in all municipalities; the share (1-v) that did not vote for SD is always above 86 
percent and at the same time the share of the minority is always below 46 percent. 
  25FSI by marginal prejudice defined by SD and find that the estimate increases quite 
substantially to -0.15.
22 Hence, this result suggests that measurement error in the 
marginal prejudice measure leads to substantial downward bias. 
In the fourth to sixth column this exercise is repeated but with the change that also 
the share with negative attitudes is included and instrumented. The reason why we do not 
find a correlation between the ethnic wage gap and the share with negative attitudes in 
the main analysis could be because the share with negative attitudes is measured with 
error. However, that does not appear to be the case since column six, if anything, 
indicates that both the direct effect and the interaction now are statistically imprecise and 
the interaction effect is close to zero.
23 
In this section we have shown that adding a number of specific control variables 
indicates the existence of a small but important positive bias for our marginal prejudice 
estimate, while both endogenous geographic sorting and measurement error indicate the 
existence of a much more severe downward bias in the same estimate. Throughout this 
analysis the estimate for the share of employers with negative attitudes remains 
statistically unimportant for the ethnic wage gap. This sensitivity analysis then confirms 
and strengthens what was found in the main analysis, namely, that it is the attitude of the 
marginal employer that is important for the ethnic wage gap and not the share of 
employers with negative attitudes.  
                                                 
22 The t-value of the first stage regression is 55.  
23 This result is not due to the instrument being weak since the t-value in the first stage regression is 4, see 
Table 4. 
  26Of interest is also to what extent prejudice of the marginal employer successfully 
explains the wage difference between native Swedes and the ethnic minority. In many of 
the models in Table 2 to 4 the point estimate of the ethnic minority indicator actually 
becomes zero, indicating that prejudice of the marginal employer is important enough to  
explain the whole ethnic wage gap. However, interpreting the impact of prejudice in such 
a way is premature since the precision of the point estimate is too weak, with its 
confidence interval often incorporating negative values as well. Hence, we are reluctant 
to draw any firm conclusions as to whether marginal prejudice explains the whole ethnic 
wage gap or only a portion of it.   
 
6. Discussion 
Our starting point in this paper was the observation that there is substantial variation in 
ethnic wage gaps across Europe and also in population attitudes toward ethnic minorities. 
If population attitudes also reflect employer attitudes a relevant hypothesis is that the 
variation in attitudes, at least to some extent, explains the variation in the ethnic wage 
gap. However, a simple plot of the ethnic wage gap against the population share of 
negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities for 15 European countries does not disclose 
any clear relationship between the two variables. But with Becker’s prejudice model in 
mind this is perhaps not so surprising since it is not the share of employers with negative 
attitudes that should be important for the ethnic wage gap, but rather the prejudice of the 
marginal employer. 
Despite this clear predication from Becker’s model we are only aware of one 
empirical paper – Charles and Guryan´s study of the US labor market – that examines the 
  27link between the prejudice of the marginal employer and the ethnic wage gap. In contrast 
to Charles and Guryan, the current study takes a European perspective by examining the 
prejudice-ethnic wage gap link for Sweden, which is often viewed as one of the most 
egalitarian countries among the EU states. 
 Our main analysis supports the hypothesis that it is marginal prejudice and not the 
share of employers with negative attitudes that is important for the ethnic wage gap. But 
do the results have a causal interpretation? The major issue is the potential existence of 
omitted variables either at the municipality or worker level, which are correlated both 
with the ethnic wage gap and with negative attitudes. In an attempt to address problems 
of this kind we included what we believe are proper control variables at the municipality 
level and worker level and also instrumented the prejudice measures. Instrumental 
variables techniques were also implemented in order to deal with potential measurement 
error in the prejudice measures. These exercises did, if anything, strengthen our previous 
findings in that there exist enough prejudiced employers in relation to the supply of 
ethnic minority workers to arrive at a significant ethnic wage gap. 
In summary, the results presented in this paper strongly support the hypothesis that 
prejudice on the behalf of the marginal employer is indeed important in creating an ethnic 
wage gap in Sweden. Rooth (2010) also provides evidence that employer attitudes matter 
in the labor market; he shows that employers with more negative attitudes toward the 
minority indeed act on such prejudice in a hiring situation. Given the similarity in the 
economic situation for the ethnic minority in Sweden and in other EU states, and that 
Sweden usually is presented as one of the most egalitarian countries within EU, it is 
likely that what we present here also holds in other EU countries. Therefore, EU 
  28authorities may have to further strengthen discrimination legislation and its preventive 
work with respect to prejudice against ethnic minorities. 
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Note: Data on the ethnic/immigrant wage gap are taken from Adsera and Chiswick (2007) and the share 
with negative attitudes in the population is calculated from the European Social Survey by merging the 
results for waves 1-5. From the left (lowest level of prejudice) to the right (highest level of prejudice) in the 
Figure the countries are: Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, France, 
Luxemburg, United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Finland, and Greece. 
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Figure 2. The attitude of the marginal employer. 
 
Note:  This figure is taken from Charles and Guryan (2008). 
 
  33Figure 3. The distribution of average attitudes across 290 Swedish municipalities. FSI-
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Note: The share of respondents in a municipality answering Not very valuable or Not valuable at all to the 
question: What do you think of the immigrants that we have received regarding their contribution to the 
Swedish population? The two alternative answers were Quite and Very valuable. 
  34Figure 4. Variation in marginal and average attitudes and the ethnic wage gap. 
 
Note: For marginal attitudes light colors imply less, and dark more, negative attitudes of the marginal 
employers. For average attitudes and the ethnic wage gap their distributions are divided into three equal 
parts. Light colors then correspond to the least negative (lowest) third, medium colors to the middle third, 
and dark colors to the most negative (largest) third of average attitudes (ethnic wage gap). The circles 
enclose the Stockholm (largest circle), Gothenburg (medium circle) and Malmö LMAs. These three LMA 















Table 1. Log earnings 2003 (Earnings> 100,000 SEK). N = 435,677. 













Share with negative attitudes  -  -  -0.16*** 
[0.06] 
- -  -0.13* 
[0.07] 
Minority * share with negative attitudes  -  -  -0.05 
[0.08] 
- -  0.02 
[0.06] 
















Control variables        






























Municipality  fe  Yes  No No No No No 
Share minority individuals in a region  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: No additional controls other than those listed in the table. *, ** and *** denote the ten, five and one 
percent significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors (in brackets) are robust.37
           
Table 2. Log earnings 2003 (Earnings > 100,000 SEK). N = 435,677. 
  FSI attitude measure  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minority 0.04
[0.03] 














































































Control variables:          
































Years of schooling  -  -  0.07*** 
[0.001] 
-     
               
                 
                 
               
- - 0.07***
[0.001] 
  0.07*** 
[0.001] 
Share minority individuals in a region 
 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional  unemployment No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional  ethnic  cognitive  gap No No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Immigrant  characteristics  (regional)
 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Shifted  prejudice  distribution No No No No No No No Yes
Note: No additional controls other than those listed in the table. *, ** and *** denote the ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. Reported 
standard errors (in brackets) are robust. Shifted prejudice distribution refers to the case when we assume that no employers belong to the ethnic minority when 
calculating the marginal prejudice measure, see Section 5.2. 
 
 Table 3. Log earnings 2003 (Earnings > 100,000 SEK). All occupations. N = 435,677.  

















































t-value of first stage regressions         
Share with negative attitudes  -  -  -  -  -  524 
Attitude of the marginal employer  - -  219  - -  197 
FSI attitude measure at LMA level:        
Reduced  form  No Yes No No Yes No 
IV    No No Yes No No Yes 
Note: All models control for age, age squared, years of schooling, share minority individuals in a region, 
regional unemployment, regional ethnic cognitive gap, regional immigrant characteristics. *, ** and *** 
denote the ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors (in brackets) 
are robust. 
  38 
Table 4. Log earnings 2003 (Earnings > 100,000 SEK). All occupations. N = 435,677. 

















































t-value(s) of first stage regressions        
Share with negative attitudes  - - - - -  381 
Attitude of the marginal employer  - -  55  - -  4 
SD attitude measure:        
Reduced  form  No Yes No No Yes No 
IV    No No Yes No No  Yes 
Note: All models control for age, age squared, years of schooling, share minority individuals in a region, 
regional unemployment, regional ethnic cognitive gap, regional immigrant characteristics. *, ** and *** 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel a) Variables at the individual level  Majority Minority 
    
Log earnings  12.37   (0.91)  12.27   (1.06) 
Age  39.80   (3.14)  39.48   (3.12) 
Years of schooling  11.96   (2.15)  12.14   (2.33) 
Years of schooling missing  0.0008      -  0.0020     - 
N 472,690  36,670 
Panel b) Variables at the municipality level     
    
Share with negative attitudes  0.45   (0.12)   
Attitude of the marginal employer  0.43   (0.50)   
Attitude p90  0.57   (0.50)   
Share with negative attitudes (shifted prejudice distribution)  0.50   (0.14)   
Attitude of the marginal employer (shifted prejudice distribution)  0.72   (0.45)   
Share with negative attitudes (SD attitude measure)  0.06  (0.03)   
Attitude of the marginal employer (SD attitude measure)  0.47   (0.50)   
Share minority  0.09  (0.06)   
Regional unemployment  0.07   (0.02)   
Regional ethnic cognitive gap  -0.69   (0.60)   
Share of refugees among the immigrants  0.03  (0.03)   
Share of immigrants from outside the EU  0.46   (0.13)   
Share on income support among the foreign born   0.14   (0.03)   
N 290   
Panel c) Variables at the LMA level    
    
Share with negative attitudes  0.44   (0.10)   
Attitude of the marginal employer  0.40   (0.49)   
N 78   
Note: This table reports the mean of variables at the individual, municipality, and LMA level, respectively. 
For continuous variables standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table A2. Log earnings 2003 (Positive earnings). N = 477,643 













Share with negative attitudes  -  -  -0.13 
[0.09] 
- -  -0.10 
[0.11] 
Minority * share with negative attitudes  -  -  0.01 
[0.18] 
- -  0.14 
[0.13] 
















Control variables         






























Municipality  fe  Yes  No No No No No 
Share minority individuals in a region  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: No additional controls other than those listed in the table. *, ** and *** denote the ten, five and one 
percent significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors (in brackets) are robust.Table A3. Log earnings 2003 (Positive earnings). N = 477,643 
  FSI attitude measure  (1)  (2) (3)            (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minority -0.05  -0.09 













































































Control variables:          
































Years of schooling  -  -  0.09*** 
[0.002] 
-     
               
               
- - 0.09***
[0.00] 
  0.09*** 
[0.00] 
Share minority individuals in a region 
 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional  unemployment No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional ethnic cognitive gap  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Immigrant characteristics (regional) 
 
No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Shifted  prejudice  distribution No No No No No No No Yes
Note: No additional controls other than those listed in the table. *, ** and *** denote the ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. Reported 
standard errors (in brackets) are robust. Shifted prejudice distribution refers to the case when we assume that no employers belong to the ethnic minority when 
calculating the marginal prejudice measure, see Section 5.2. 
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